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IN THE S.UPREME. COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
jiARIE C. CLAUSSE, Administra-
trix of the Estate of LEON L. 
CLAUSSE, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY CORPORA-
TION, a corporation, FIR'ST SE-
CURITY BANK OF UTAH, a cor-
poration, and AMERICAN NA-
TIONAL INSURANC·E COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
D·efenda.nts and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
7930 
The p·arties are referred to herein as follows: Marie 
C. Clausse, administratrix of the Estate of Leon L. 
Clausse, deceased, as a.p·pellant; First Security Bank of 
Utah, as the Bank; and American National Insurance 
Company, as the Insurance Company. 
This is an appeal fro1n an order of the trial court 
granting a non-suit as to both respondents at the con-
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elusion of the appellant's case, without submitting the 
matter to a jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is -an action on an oral contract entered into by 
Leon L. Clausse, deceased, with the respondents. The 
details of the contract are as follows: Mr. and Mrs. 
Leon L. Clausse, on or about the 18th day of December, 
1948, mortgaged their home in Ogden, Utah, for $2,500.00 
with the respondent bank. Mr. S. T. Jeppesen and Mr. 
Carl Porter represented the bank in this transaction. 
After having app-roved the said loan, l\1:r. Jeppesen and 
Mr. Porter, both Vice-Presidents of the said bank, pro-
posed to Mr. Clausse that he insure the mortgage under 
"The First Security Mortgage Cancellation Plan," and 
explained to him that by contracting with the respondent 
bank for said plan, his mortgage would be insured so that 
in case of his death it would be paid off and cancelled. 
Mr. Clausse accepted their offer and agreed to insure 
said mortgage under the plan for $2,000.00 and also 
agreed that the mortgage· insurance premiums should 
be added by the respondent bank to his monthly mortgage 
installments, the first of which was to be paid on Feb-
ruary 1, 1949 at the bank. Mr. Clausse was informed 
at said time by Mr. Jeppesen that his mortgage pro-
tection would begin when the note and mortgage were 
signed and would continue throughout the life of the 
mortgage. Mr. Clausse agreed to make written applica-
tion for insurance through a representative to be sent 
to his home by the bank, and was later advised by letter 
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dated December 27, 1948, that said representative would 
call to explain the ~lortgage Cancellation Plan which 
had been worked out by the bank with the respondent 
Insurance Cn1npany, and "which at a very nominal cost, 
will guarantee the payment of your mortgage for you 
in case of your death * * * ." (Plaintiff's Ex. "C"). 
On January 5, 1949, 1VIr. Reynolds Blackington, local 
representative of the respondent Insurance Company, 
called on Mr. Clausse at his home, ·stated that he had 
been sent there by Mr. Jeppesen to go over the mortgage 
insurance plan (Tr. p. 30). He took Mr. Clausse's·appli-
cation for $2,000.00 of insurance on his life, made the 
defendant bank the beneficiary, and informed Mr. Clausse 
that the n1ortgage insurance was in effect then (Tr. ppo 
36, 96). He also stated that the premiums should be paid 
monthly at the respondent bank as arranged with Mr. 
Jeppesen. On the next day, Mr. Clausse was examined 
by the Insurance Company doctor who told him that he 
had passed. No policy was ever delivered to Mr. Clausse. 
On January 24, 1949, Mr. Clausse suddenly died from a 
heart attack, before the first premium on the mortgage 
insurance was due. Both the respondent bank and Insur-
ance Con1pany refused to pay off the mortgage as agreed. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The plaintiff makes the following Assignments of 
Error. 
A. As to Respondent Bank. 
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The Trial Court erred: 
1. In granting the Respondent Bank's motion for a 
non-suit on the ground that there were not sufficient facts 
to· warrant the cause being submitted to a jury, because; 
a. Appellant's evidence regarding an oral con-
tract between Leon L. Clausse and the Respondent 
Bank should not have been stricken by the trial court. 
b. The stricken evidence states sufficient facts 
concerning said oral agreement to be· submitted to the 
JUry. 
B. As to the Respondent Insurance Company. 
The Trial C·ourt erred : 
1. In granting the R,espondent Insurance Coin-
pany's motion for a non-suit on the ground that there was 
not sufficient facts to warrant the cause being submitted 
to a jury, because; 
a. Appellant's .evidence regarding an oral con-
tract between Leon L. Clausse and the Respondent 
Insurance Company should not have been stricken 
by the trial court. 
b. The stricken evidence states sufficient facts 
concerning said oral agreement to be submitted to the 
JUry. 
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ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE REGARDING AN ORAL 
CONTRACT BETWEEN LEON L. CLAUSSE AND THE RE-
SPONDENT BANK SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STRICKEN 
BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Though the Court below did not state the grounds 
upon which it found that there were not sufficient facts 
to warrant the cause being submitted to a jury, it seems 
clear that it based its said. ruling on the proposition that 
the testimony of the plaintiff and of Roscoe Clausse 
should be stricken on the grounds presented by the bank. 
Consequently the legality of the non-suit is contingent 
upon the correctness of the Courts ruling on the bank's 
motion to strike the testimony of said two witnesses. 
The appellant will, therefore, first discuss said motion. 
The bank's motion to strike the testimony of the 
plaintiff and of Roscoe Clausse was based "upon the 
ground that there is no evidence that either S. T. Jep-
pesen or Carl Porter or J. D. Madson, or either of them, 
had authority to bind this defendant bank in any enforce-
able oral contract as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, and 
that if any such agreement was made, the agreement 
would be unenforceable against this bank unless they had 
authority to bind the bank." (Tr. P. 71, L. 6 to 13) 
The motion to strike all of the testimony concerning 
the statements 1nade by Reynolds Blackington with re-
spect to said agreement was based upon the ground that 
"there is no evidence in this case that Blackington had any 
authority of any kind whatsoever to bind the defendant, 
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the First Security Bank, and that any declarations made 
by him would be purely hearsay statements made with-
out any authority whatsoever." (Tr. P. 70, L. 24-30) 
On this point the law is very clear that the plaintiff 
had no burden to prove that either of said bank officials 
or representatives had authority to bind the bank. The 
real question is not whether they had such actual author-
ity but whether the GOntract they n1ade with the deceased 
on behalf of the bank was within the apparent scope of 
their authority as officers and representatives of the 
bank. Story on Agency P. 126, Par. 114 writes: 
"It may be stated as a general proposition 
that the officers of a bank are held out to the pub-
lic as having authority to act according to the 
general usage, practice, and course of business 
of such institutions, and that their acts, within 
the scope of such usage, practice, and course of 
business, bind the bank in favor of third persons, 
having no knowledge to the contrary." 
7 Am. J ur. 161 Par. 225: 
"When a bank opens its doors for business 
with the public and places officers in charge, per-
sons dealing with them in good faith, and without 
any notice of any want of authority, will be pro-
tected where an act is performed in the apparent 
scope of the officers authority, whether the officer 
is actually clothed with such authority or not." 
In Union Savings & Trust Co. vs. Krumm, 152 Pac. 
681 on P. 684 the court states the rule as follows: 
. "The real question is, were the acts done with-
In the apparent scope of his authority in view of 
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all of the circun1stances or n1ore correctly speak-
ing, u·as the et·idence capable of justifiable infer-
ences suff·ic-i.ent to take the question to the jury? 
rrhe rule is \Vell settled that persons dealing ,v}th 
corporate agencies have the right to rely upon the 
apparent authority of those in charge of the cor-
porate business, and for acts done within the scope 
of such apparent authority the corporation is 
bound." 
Bank of An1erica et al vs. Slotcky confirms the doc-
trine that 
""As an executive officer of the bank he is pre-
smned to have acted within the scope of his au-
thority until a showing is made to the contrary." 
The Utah Supreme Court uphold this principle in the 
following language: 
'~It is a general principle of the law of agency, 
running through all contracts made by agents with 
third parties, that the principals are bound by the 
acts of their agents which fall within the apparent 
scope of the authority of the agents, who have 
dealt with these agents in good faith. That general 
principle of agency is universally recognized and 
applied by the courts, and is laid down by every 
text-writer who has written on the subject of 
agency." Harrison vs. Auto Security Co., 70 Utah 
11, 257 Pac. 677. 
So also did the Supreine Court of Utah accept this 
rule of ''Indicia of Authority" in Jones vs. Commercial 
Investment Trust Co., 64 Utah 139, wherein the court . 
quoted froin Glass vs. Cont. Guarentee C·orp., 88 So. 876 
(28 A.L.R. 312) as follo,vs: 
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"But,where an owner consigns personal·prop-
erty to a dealer in such goo~s with expr~ss or im-
plied authority to sell or del1ver or consign to an-
other personal property with indicia of ownership, 
or authority to sell b~t with title reserved in the 
owner until the payment of the purchase price, a 
purchaser who pays. value for such goods and gets 
possession thereof without notice of the ter1ns and 
conditions of the original delivery, consign1nent or 
sale, obtains a good title as against the original 
owner, which will in general, prevail against the 
latters reserved title." 
This rule is well stated in 13 Am. Juris. 870, Par. 890 
as follows: 
"It is a fundamental and well settled rule that 
when, in the usual course of the business of a 
corporation, an officer or other agent is held out 
by the corporation or has been permitted to act 
for it or manage its affairs in such a way as to 
justify third persons who deal with him in infer-
ring or assu1ning that he is doing an act or making 
a contract within the scope of his authority, the 
corporation is bound thereby, even though such 
officer or agent has not the actual authority from 
the corporation to do such an act or make such a 
con tract." · 
The real question in the instant case is not, therefore, 
as the bank contended, whether the said officers and 
agents of the bank actually had authority to make the 
contract in question with Mr. Clausse. The appellant had 
no burden to prove such authority. The vital point is 
whether said' officers and agents of the bank acted in such 
a way as to justify Mr. Clausse, W'ko dealt with them, 
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in believing or ass~tming that they were making a con-
tract w·ithin the scope of their authority as agents of said 
corporatio'n. The determination of this fact was a matter 
for the jury, and not the court, to decide. 
Let us no"\v apply the above rule of law to the facts 
of this case. The evidence shows that Mr. S. T. Jeppesen 
and 1\fr. Carl Porter were both Vice Presidents of the 
Bank, and that Mr. J. D. Madsen was Assistant Vice 
President. Mr. Jeppesen was in charge of real estate 
loans for the bank. All three of said officers had offices 
in said bank. Mrs. Clausse went into the place of business 
of the bank and applied for a loan on the Clausse home to 
:Thfr. Jeppesen and, as a result of her application, the two 
said vice presidents went to sai,d home and appraised it on 
behalf of the Bank for a loan. After having approved 
a loan for $2,500 on said home, and while they were still 
on the premises of the deceased, they handed Mr. Clausse 
a printed pamphlet relating to a Mortgage Cancellation 
Plan. (Ptf's Ex. A) The said pamphlet referred to said 
plan as "The First ·security Mortgage Cancellation Plan". 
The deceased was urged . by said bank officers to insure 
his mortgage under said plan. When Mr. Clausse agreed 
to do so, arrangements were made by said officials for 
him to pay the premiums on said mortgage insurance to 
the bank with the installments of his mortgage. On the 
day that the note and mortgage were signed by Mrs. 
Clausse in Mr. Jeppesen's office in the bank, he informed 
her that Mr. Clausse had "authorized him to go ahead 
with the insurance," and that he would send an agent 
out to her home to write up a policy. (Tr. P. 25, L. 16 to 
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21) Subsequently on December 27, 1953 ~Ir. J. D. ~fad­
sen Assistance Vice President of the Bank sent to Mr. 
' Clausse what appears to be a for1n letter in which he ad-
vised Mr. Clausse that "In line with the policy of many 
loan companies who recognize this fact, we have worked 
out with the American National Insurance Co1npany a 
plan, which at a very nominal cost, will guarantee the 
payment of your mortgage for you in case of your death." 
He then wrote that he was asking Reynolds Blackington, 
local representative of the said Insurance Company, to 
call and explain the plan, and assured him that, "You 1nay 
listen to his explanation without feeling that he is there 
to sell you additional life insurance, but rather to explain 
to you a plan W'hich we believe is very desirable." (Ptf's 
Ex. Band C) 
Certainly under such circumstances, the deceased was 
justified in believing that the officers were acting within 
the scope of their authority from the bank and were rep-
resenting the bank when they presented hiln with a pam-
phlet described as "The First Security Mortgage Can-
cellation Plan" and urged him to insure his 1nortgage 
under it. The arrangements 1nade with said bank officers 
to add the insurance installments to the mortgage install-
ments together with the assurance in the letter written b~· 
Mr. Madsen, Asst. Vice President of the Bank, that the 
plan was one that had been worked out between the two 
respondents and was not a life insurance plan, was addi-
tional assurance to Mr. Clausse that all of the officers 
and agents who contacted hi1n relating to it were acting 
for said bank. 
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According to the testin1ony of Mrs. Clausse and 
Roscoe Clausse, Mr. Blackington told the deceased that 
he had been sent by the Bank officers, and confirmed the 
state1nent of said bank officers that the premiums were 
to be paid at the bank each month beginning February 1, 
1949, and that the mortgage insurance was at that time in 
effect. The application for life insurance made the Bank 
the beneficiary, which fact alone was justification for the 
deceased to conclude that the insurance he was at that 
time applying for 'vas a part of "the plan" and was for 
the protection of the bank in case of his death. He was, 
furthermore, justified in assuming that the said Insur-
ance Company agent was representing both the bank and 
the Insurance Company from what ·he said and did on 
that occasion. 
Certainly the facts of the case warranted the Inatter 
being submitted to the jury for the purpose of deter-
Inining whether the deceased was justified in believing 
and assuming that those who contacted him with resp·ect 
to the Mortgage insurance plan were representing the 
Bank and were acting within the apparent scope of their 
authority from the Bank, and that he was contracting 
for mortgage insurance and not life insurance, as the 
Bank contended. 
THE STRICKEN EVIDENCE STATES SUFFICIENT 
FACTS CONCERNING SAID ORAL AGREEMENT TO BE 
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
'!'~he evidence relating to the oral contract regarding 
the F:irst Security Mortgage Cancellation Plan which 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
was entered into between Leon L. Clausse, deceased, and 
the two respondents was presented by the plaintiff and 
Roscoe Clausse. Their testimony was stricken by the 
court on motion of the respondents in so far as it applied 
to them. The testimony of those two witnesses definitely 
stated that an offer of mortgage insurance ha:d been made 
by Mr. S. T. J eppeson and Carl Porter, both Vice Presi-
dents of the Respondent Bank, to the deceased, and that 
it was acceptable by him. The consideration- monthly 
premiums to be paid by the deceased to the bank- had 
been agreed upon and the deceased had authorized 
the bank to add the insurance premiums to his monthly 
payments on his note and mortgage, in return for which 
the bank agreed to cancel the mortgage in case of his 
death. The testimony was definite that the insurance 
took effe'Ct on the signing of the note and mortgage. Both 
the deceased and the bank were competent to enter into 
such a contract, and the oral agreement was supported 
by written proof. (Ptf's Exs. A, B & C) 
This court has repeatedly held that in considering 
a motion to dismiss or a non-suit for insufficiency of the 
evidence, as in the instant case, "all of the plaintiff's evi-
dence together with all legitimate inferences that can be 
deducted therefrom must be conceded to be true. For 
the purposes of the motion, the defendant admits every 
inference deducible from any facts that were proved." 
In such matters it is the duty of the court "to consider 
facts well pleaded and admitted as true, and to give plain-
tiff the benefit of every legitimate inference and intent-
ment which may fairly and legitimately arise fron1 the 
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180; Smith vs. Columbus Buggy Co., 40 Ut. 580, 123 P. 
580; Dunn vs. Salt Lake & 0. R. Co., 47 Ut. 137, 151 P. 
979. 
If the testimony of the plaintiff and of Roscoe 
Clausse is permitted to stand by this court, it is apparent 
from the record that there is ample evidence of an oral 
contract between Leon L. Clausse and the two respond-
ents to be submitted to the jury. 
APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE REGARDING AN ORAL 
CONTRACT BETWEEN LEON L. CLAUSSE, DECEASED, 
AND THE RESPONDENT INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN STRICKEN BY THE COURT. 
The insurance company motion to strike the testi-
mony of the plaintiff and of R.oscoe Clausse p·ertaining 
to any conversations between the deceased and their 
agent, Reynolds Blackington, was made "On the ground 
that it tends to vary the terms of a written instrument, 
·and that no evidence has been introduced to show the 
authority of Mr. Blackington to alter or amend the con-
tract evidenced by the written application. I further 
move to strike the testimony of Mrs. Clausse, any con-
versations between her and her husband and representa-
tives of the First Security Bank of Utah, on the ground 
that such testimony is hearsay as to the American Na-
tional Insurance C·ompany in this state, that there is no 
evidence to indicate that any officers of the First Security 
Bank had authority to speak on behalf of the Insurance 
Comp·any." (Tr. P. 68 L. 24 to L. 7 P. 69) 
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Its motion for a directed verdict was made "on the 
ground and for the reason that plaintiff has failed to 
show or establish any contract between the defendant 
insurance company and plaintiff's decedent, plaintiff's 
deceased husband; that plaintiff ha.s failed to show any 
authority on behalf of Reynolds Blackington, or any of 
the officers of the First Security Bank of Utah, to make a 
contract on behalf of the American National Insurance 
Company other than the written application exhibit "1", 
which expressly states on its face that the liability of the 
· company may be had, only by, only in accordance with 
the terms of such application, and that no officer, no 
agent of the Insurance Company has authority to vary 
the terms." (Tr. P. 69 L. 13-24) 
At no time has the appellant introduced evidence 
which tends to vary the terms of the written application 
of the deceased_ for life insurance. She admits that 
the application was made and does not dispute any part 
of it. This is not a suit on said application for life insur-
ance, and the appellant contends that the making of it 
to the respondent Insurance Company wherein the Re-
spondent Bank was the beneficiary, was one of the things 
which had to be done by the deceased in order that he 
might receive protection on his mortgage under the 
Mortgage Cancellation Plan which he was informed had 
been worked out between the Respondent Bank and the 
Respondent Insurance Co. ( Ptf's Exhibit "C"). The 
evidence indicates that said requirement was a part of 
an arrangement between the two said respondents for 
their mutual benefit. In fact the bank's letter of Decem· 
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ber 27, 1948 to the deceased specifically states that what 
~fr. Blackington-the Insurance Company's Agent-was 
to present to the deceased \vas Hnot to sell you additional 
life insurance, but rather to explain to you a plan, etc." 
The plan which was explained to the deceased by said 
agent was the same one which Mr. Jeppesen and Mr. 
Porter of the bank had previously explained: one of 
mortgage insurance, which he said was then in effect. 
The evidence clearly indicates that his making of the 
application for insurance and the subsequent taking of a 
physical exa1nination, were done for the benefit of the 
two respondents and not for the deceased. He was mere-
ly doing what he was required to do under his Mortgage 
Cancellation Agreement. He had no direct interest 1n 
the Life Insurance Policy, except what might have ac-
crued to him from it under the Cancellation agreement if 
he had lived to pay off the mortgage. Consequently the 
testimony objected to in no way tendered to vary the 
terms of the said application. 
The second motion made by the Insurance Com-
pany was based on the proposition that appellant showed 
no authority for Mr. Blackington or the said officers 
of the First ·security Bank to make an oral contract on 
behalf of the Insurance Company. 
The rule of law relating to the apparent authority 
of corporation officers was discussed above in this brief. 
The sa1ne rule applies to the agents of insurance com-
panies, as clearly stated in Payne vs. New York Life Ins. 
Co., 23 .P. (2d) 6, as follows after the court had stated 
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that it was acquainted with the limitation of authority 
of soliciting agents to bind the Company: 
"There is another rule which should not be 
overlooked. It must be borne in mind, when con-
sidering the general rule quoted above. As in the 
case of agencies in general, an insurance com-
pany is bound by all acts, contracts, or representa-
tions of its agents, whether general or special, 
which are within his real or apparent authority, 
notwithstanding they are in violation of private 
instructions or limitations upon his authority, of 
which the person dealing with him, acting in good 
faith, has neither actual or constructive knowl-
edge." 
In holding that an insurer was liable for soliciting 
agents' conduct within the apparent scope of his auth-
ority in the absence of- evidence that the one relying 
thereon knew of the agent's limitations, the Court said 
-in the case of Contirnental Ca.sualty Co. vs. Lin.n, 226 Ky. 
328, 10 S.W. (2d) 1079, on p. 1081: 
"Soliciting agents are entrusted with power 
to obtain business for the co1npanies they repre-
sent and the consequent profits of the con1panies 
are obtained by thern. An insurance agent repre-
sents his company and stands in its place in hi~ 
community. Ordinarily, he is the only person the 
policy holder knows and deals with in his tran-
sactions with the insurer. He is dealt with on the 
faith of his authority to do those things which 
he clain1s and has the ostensible right to do." 
It is universally held that the question whether an 
agent had such ostensible authority is a question for the 
jury. 
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The facts of this case 'vith respent to the Insurance 
Con1pany are of such a nature as to raise a strong infer-
ence that both Mr. Blackington and the officers of the 
First Security Bank were representing both of the re-
spondents in their dealings with Mr. Clausse relating to 
the Mortgage Cancellation Plan. The bank sent Mr. 
Blackington to the deceased. He presented the same in-
formation to the deceased regarding the plan as the bank 
officials had done. The bank declared in writing that the 
)Iortgage Cancellation Plan had been worked out be-
tween the two respondents. This was not denied by the 
insurance company agent. The making of the bank the 
beneficiary in the life insurance application and the in-
structions to pay the premiums to the bank each point 
to the fact that the mortgage insurance project was a 
joint one of the respondents. 
The insurance application was made out on January 
5, 1949 and was in the possession of the Insurance Com-
pany for a period of 19 days before the death of the 
applicant. If the mortgage plan was not a joint one as 
it was stated to be in the bank's letter to the deceased, 
- then the Insurance C-ompany had plenty of time in which 
to inquire into the reason why it was to receive its 
pre1niu1ns from the bank, and why the bank was sending 
-· the Insurance Company's agent to its customers, and to 
.. advise the deceased as to the true facts concerning its 
connection with the Mortgage Insurance Plan. The fact 
·. that it did nothing of the sort, certainly gave the deceased 
plenty of. reason to believe that the agent of the Insur-
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ance Company and the officers of the bank were repre-
senting both of the respondents. 
It is inconceivable that a large and reputable bank 
like the First Security Bank of Utah, would make the 
representations it did through its officers and in a printed 
pamphlet ( Ptf' s Ex. "A") and by letter to the deceased 
(Ptf's E_xs. "B" and "C") and send an insurance company 
agent to its customers without having worked out a joint 
program with th_e Insurance Company, particularly in 
view. of the fact that insurance companies lend money 
on real property in competition with banks. So likewise 
is it inconceivable that the insurance company's agent 
could carry on as Mr. Blackington did in the instant case 
without the company knowing what representations were 
being made by him to the bank's customers. Sound 
reason based upon the facts of this case says that the 
Mortgage Cancellation Plan as presented to the deceased 
by the representatives of both the bank and the insurance 
comp·any was a joint one as it was represented to the 
deceased as being, and that Blackington, Jeppesen, Por-
ter, and Madsen ostensibly represented both respondents 
as to it. Certainly there was sufficient evidence that such 
was the case to be submitted to the jury, particularly in 
light of the following statement of the Court in the case 
of Dunn vs. S.L. db 0. Ry. Co., 151 P. 979, on p. 981: 
"Nor: is it ~ate rial whether the evidence upon 
the qu~stion - IS strong or weak. By interposing 
a motion for a non-suit the defendant not onlv 
admitted every fact directly proved but likewise 
admitted every inference deducibie from any 
facts that were proved." 
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THE STRICKEN EVIDENCE STATES SUFFICIENT 
FACTS TO CONSTITUTE A BINDING ORAL CONTRACT 
BETWEEN THE DECEASED AND THE INSURANCE COM-
PANY. 
Just as the stricken testimony of the plaintiff and 
Roscoe Clausse presented the elements of a binding oral 
agreement between the deceased and the bank, so did it 
prove a verbal agree1nent between the Insurance Com-
pany and the deceased, which should have been s.ub-
mitted to the jury, as has been pointed out before in this. 
brief. 
·From the law and the facts discussed herein the 
appellant respectfully contends that the trial court erred 
in granting a non-suit and in refusing to s.ubmit to the 
jury the appellant's evidence concerning an oral agree-
ment on a Mortgage Cancellation Plan between the de-
ceased, Leon L. Clausse, and the two respondents. Appel-
lant prays that the order of the lower court be set aside 
and that this court grant a new trial on the grounds 
discussed herein, and that she have costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
IIERBERT B. MAW, 
Attorney for App-ellant. 
214 Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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